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Improving the Administration
of the National Labor Relations Act
Without Statutory Change
Samuel Estreicher*
For the first time in more than three decades, there is now considerable
political momentum for the passage of significant pro-union amendments to
the basic federal labor law, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
1
Act). First enacted in 1935, the Act is administered by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board), an independent agency of the federal
2
government. Five members serve on the Board when it is at full strength;
3
the General Counsel of the agency is an independent office. The Act was
4
amended to restrict union organizing and bargaining tactics in 1947 and
5
1959. Aside from the 1974 amendments that extended the Act’s reach to
6
the not-for-profit health care sector, there have been no further substantive
changes in the statute. The Act has not been changed despite a plummeting
unionization rate in private companies – from thirty-five percent in the mid1950s to under eight percent today – and persistent complaints from the
labor movement and its congressional allies, who argue that employer
opposition, both lawful and unlawful, is eviscerating the rights of association and collective bargaining the Act supposedly safeguards.
Labor’s effort during the Carter administration to bolster NLRA remedies for unlawful employer conduct, the Labor Reform Act of 1977, did not
*
Samuel Estreicher is the Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Labor and Employment Law at New York University School of Law. This paper was originally published under the same title in 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L.1 (2009). An earlier version of this paper was
delivered at NYU’s 62nd Annual Conference on Labor on June 4, 2009. Professor Estreicher wishes to
acknowledge the helpful comments of National Labor Relations Board officials Peter Carlton, John
Ferguson, Wayne Gold, John Higgins, Wilma Liebman, and Ronald Meisburg; Elizabeth Kilpatrick was
invaluable on NLRB data. Any persisting mistakes are entirely the author’s responsibility. Copyright ©
by Samuel Estreicher 2009-2011. All rights are reserved.
1
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
2
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a).
3
NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d).
4
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
5
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
6
Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 168, 171
(2006)).
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7

gather enough support to overcome a threatened filibuster in the Senate.
Twenty years later, President Clinton had his secretaries of labor and
commerce appoint the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, chaired by Harvard professor John T. Dunlop, who served as
secretary of labor in the Ford administration. Though tempered by the 1994
midterm election results, the Dunlop Commission recommended greater
access to employers’ property by union organizers, quicker representation
8
elections, and stronger remedies for employer violations. Those recommendations were not implemented. Since the Clinton administration, a
rising chorus of voices among union-side practitioners and academics has
9
questioned whether the NLRA has become obsolete.
The 2008 election cycle suggests, however, a shift in the political
winds and a more promising political environment for pro-union changes in
the NLRA. With strong backing from organized labor, Barack Obama regained the presidency for the Democrats and brought with him commanding Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. There is now
considerable avowed support for the proposed Employee Free Choice Act
(EFCA), labor’s principal legislative priority. The EFCA, which passed the
10
House of Representatives in 2007, would alter labor law in three significant ways.
First, section 2 authorizes so-called “card-check certification” by the
NLRB. Such certification essentially allows unions to obtain bargaining
authority and trigger an employer’s duty to bargain solely by presenting to
the agency authorization card signatures from a majority of employees in an
appropriate unit. Elections would no longer be required.
Second, section 3 provides that if ninety days of bargaining between a
certified union representative and the employer do not result in a collective
bargaining agreement, either party may petition the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS). The FMCS initially would provide mediation services, but if the parties do not come to a voluntary agreement, it
would be required to refer the dispute to an arbitration panel that “shall
render a decision settling the dispute” for a two-year period.

7

S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); 124 CONG. REG.18,398, 18,400

(1978).
8
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS xvii--xxi (1.994) [hereinafter
DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of
Labor Law Reform,12 LAB. LAW. 117, 121 (1996).
9
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527 (2002).
10 Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800,110th Cong. (2007).
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Third, section 4 requires the Board to seek preliminary injunctions to
reinstate workers discharged during organizing and election campaigns. It
authorizes the agency to levy liquidated damages of twice back pay owed to
those discharged workers and, in the case of willful or repeated employer
violations, to impose a civil penalty of up to $20,000 per violation.
As of this writing, it is not clear whether the EFCA as proposed will be
enacted. Much depends on whether its proponents can in fact marshal a
filibuster-proof majority of sixty votes in the Senate and, if not, whether a
compromise can be struck that will garner the necessary support. This
Article does not take a position on whether the EFCA should become law.
It instead identifies changes the NLRB can implement on its own, without
statutory amendment, to improve its administration of the NLRA in its core
functions of resolving questions concerning representation and enforcing
the Act’s prohibitions against employer and union misconduct. NLRB
representation elections will happen regardless of whether the EFCA
becomes law. Even at the stage of initial organization, some unions and
employee groups will continue to pursue the election route because they
wish to obtain the greater legitimacy and bargaining leverage that a
victorious secret-ballot election confers on the bargaining agent. Moreover,
elections will still be needed to decide whether to decertify unions or to de11
authorize union-security arrangements.
As the Board continues to hold elections, it is important to determine
whether it can hold them more quickly, how it can handle unit certification
and other issues more expeditiously, whether it can provide union
organizers greater and earlier access to employees, and whether it can enhance remedies for unlawful employer and union conduct that mars fair
election conditions. Similarly, the Board will still need to address bargaining obligations under the Act, whatever the EFCA’s legislative fate. Even
under a first-contract interest-arbitration regime, issues of bargaining obligation are likely to arise during the early stages when the parties attempt to
negotiate or secure arbitral imposition of a first contract, and the resolution
of those issues may inform what the arbitration panel includes in a first
12
contract.
When all contracts are up for renewal – whether those
11 For a proposal conducive to an “easy in, easy out” approach to representation elections, see
Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 501 (2000).
12 As an example of how bargaining issues may be considered, see section 43(2) of the Ontario
Labour Relations Act, which provides for consideration of the employer’s (or union’s) unreasonable
bargaining as a factor in whether to direct a first-contract interest arbitration:
(2) The Board shall consider and make its decision on an application under subsection (1) within
30 days of receiving the application and it shall direct the settlement of a first collective agreement
by arbitration where, irrespective of whether section 17 has been contravened, it appears to the
Board that the process of collective bargaining has been unsuccessful because of,
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negotiated by the parties or those imposed by arbitrations the first time
around – the NLRB will still need to determine whether a party has satisfied its duty to bargain in good faith, and identify appropriate remedies for
any violations. The scope of any legislative change depends in significant
part on the degree of confidence the players in the system have in the utility
and fairness of the Board’s administration of existing law, and their views
of the suitability of that law to current conditions.
This Article begins with suggestions for improving the Board’s procedures in representation and unfair labor practice (ULP) cases; the next section suggests modifications of key substantive rules or policies of the
agency. No attempt is made here, however, to provide a comprehensive
account of what the Board can and should do in the process of administrative overhaul.
I. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING NLRB PROCEDURES
A.

Identify and Address Causes of Delay

The first and critical step in any serious effort at reform of the Board’s
administration of the Act is to examine where agency delay is a problem;
what factors cause delay; and how the Board can minimize those factors
without undermining the overall goal of fair, efficient procedures for investigations, fact finding, adjudication, and internal review and decision
making. “Physician, heal thyself” is the appropriate maxim here. This is
not the place for an extensive analysis of the problem of administrative de13
lay under the NLRA. The chairman of the Board would be well advised to
appoint an advisory committee to investigate and analyze the problem and
offer concrete recommendations for minimizing delay and other improvements.

(a) the refusal of the employer to recognize the bargaining authority of the trade union;
(b) the uncompromising nature of any bargaining position adopted by the respondent without reasonable justification;
(c) the failure of the respondent to make reasonable or expeditious efforts to conclude a collective
agreement; or
(d) any other reason the Board considers relevant.
S.O.1995, ch.1, sched. A (amended 2006).
For a limited initial effort, see Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T. Bodie, Administrative Delay at
the NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LAB. RES. 87 (2002).
13
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1. Representation Cases
a. Reducing the Time Period Between Filing a Petition
and Holding an Election
(i) “An Appropriate Hearing”? The current debates over the EFCA
and the 1994 Dunlop Commission report suggest that too much time expires between filing an election petition and holding a representation election. This is considered problematic because employee interest in collective
representation can wane and dissipate simply by the passage of time. The
gap in time before the election takes place also enables employers to reduce
support for the union by running anti-union campaigns, whether or not the
14
tactics used are deemed unlawful.
How long is the gap between petition and election? The Dunlop
Commission noted in 1994 that the “median time from petitioning for an
election to a vote has been roughly fifty days for the last two decades (down
15
considerably from the time taken in the 1940s and 1950s).” The Board
has made considerable progress in this area. In fiscal year 2008, initial
elections in representation cases were held in a median of thirty-eight days
from the filing of the petition, and 95.1% of all initial elections were con16
ducted within fifty-six days of the filing of the petition.
The NLRA does not prescribe when an election must be held after a
petition has been filed. The Dunlop Commission recommended that representation elections should be conducted “as promptly as administratively
17
feasible, typically no later than two weeks after a petition is filed.” The
18
1977 proposed labor reform legislation would have required an election
between twenty-one days (under the House bill) or thirty days (under the
14 The assumption of this essay is that it is desirable to reduce the time between the filing of a
petition and the holding of an election. This is not necessarily true, however, if the predominant objective is to provide for an opportunity for the employee electorate to hear opposing views before casting
their ballots.
15 U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR & U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT-FINDING REPORT 66 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP
COMMISSION FACT-FINDING]; See also Myron Roomkin & Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and
the Outcome of Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U ILL. L. REV. 75, 85 (1981)
(reporting that between 1972 and 1978, the average tune in uncontested cases between filing a petition
and holding an election was about 1.75 months, compared to about 3.5 months in contested cases).
16 See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM.GC 09-03, Summary of Operations for the Fiscal
Year 2008, available at http://www.nlrb.gov/search/nlrbsearch/GC09.03. Table 1 infra indicates that
median and average time periods between filing a petition and holding an election are nearly the same
for 2000 and 2008. Ferguson also reports that for the period 1999 to 2004, “[t]he average case that went
to election did so in 41 days, and 95% of elections were held within 75 days of filing.” John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 62 INDUS.
& LAB. REL. REV. 3, 10 n.9 (2008).
17 DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT supra note 8, at 19.
18 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Senate bill) from the filing of a petition if the petitioned-for unit was appro19
priate under a Board regulation. Presumably, the Board could implement
even a fourteen-day proposal on its own. It is not clear, however, that
decreasing the existing median from thirty-eight days to fourteen days
20
21
would be administratively feasible or otherwise desirable.
Table 1: Petition, Election, Certification Comparisons, 2000 and 2008
Petition to Election
Min. No. of Days from Petition
to Election
Max. No. of Days from Petition
to Election
Average No. of Days from Petition
to Election
Median No. of Days from Petition
to Election
No. of Elections More Than 56 Days
from Petition
Election to Certification
Min. No. of Days from Election
to Certification
Max. No. of Days from Election
to Certification
Average No. of Days from Election
to Certification
Median No. of Days from Election
to Certification
No. of Certifications More Than 21 Days
from Election

2008
3

2000
6

2,152

2,108

57

53

38

41

251 of 2,024
(12.43%)
2008
0

532 of 3,497
(15.21%)
2000
0

458

3,307

22

31

11

11

361 of 1,898
(19.20%)

747 of 3,325
(22.47%)

19 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-637, at 55 (1977) (requiring an election to be held within fifteen days
after filing of petition if petitioned-for unit was defined as appropriate in a rule or prior decision in the
industry; in other cases, the election would be held within forty-five days unless issues of exceptional
novelty or complexity were presented); S. REP. NO. 95-628, at 50-51(1978) (same, except providing for
a period of twenty-one to thirty days in cases where a rule defined the requested unit as appropriate).
20 The problem may not be with average or median periods but with highly contested cases. See
discussion and Table 2 infra Part I.A.1.a.ii, Professor Cooper’s 1984 study suggests that during the
period she examined quick elections do not always benefit the union. See Laura J. Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption
Underlying the Supreme Court’s Gissel Decision, 79 N.W. U.L. REV. 87,122,122 tbl.12 (1984) (unions
succeed 18.4% of the time when elections are held within two to four weeks).
21 Expanding union access to the employee electorate would also require additional time. See
supra note 14 and discussion infra Part II.A.
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Petition for Certification
Min. No. of Days from Petition
to Certification
Max. No. of Days from Election
to Certification
Average No. of Days from Petition
to Certification
Median No. of Days from Petition
to Certification
No. of Certifications More Than 100 Days
after Election
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2008
18

2000
15

2,275

3,341

77

84

50

54

250 of 1,898
(13.17%)

486 of 3,325
(14.62%)

Source: NLRB data (on file with author).

Where cases do not involve significant issues (or the parties stipulate
to an accelerated schedule), the regional director should be able to hold a
fairly prompt election, perhaps within a two-week period. It is doubtful,
however, whether two weeks would be sufficient time, even with a strong
administrative hand, to address difficult unit and supervisor-exclusion
issues responsibly. To reduce the number of such cases, the Board might
consider changing the sequence in which it considers unit and exclusion
issues. Currently, supervisor-exclusion issues are addressed in a hearing
before an election is conducted. Perhaps in many cases the election could
happen first, based on an electorate that reflects well-established Board
decisions as to the presumptively appropriate unit and likely disposition of
eligibility issues. This could be possible in many cases, even in the absence
of a consent-election agreement between the parties. The election results
would not be certified, however, until the unit and eligibility issues were
properly resolved in a hearing at the regional level with limited discretionary review by the Board. In some cases, the results of the post-balloting
hearing might require a second election; in most cases, they would not.
During the Clinton administration, the Board looked into the issue and
22
decided that section 9(c)(1) of the Act mandates the current sequence. The
section provides in pertinent part:
22 See Angelica Healthcare Serv. Group, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1321 (1995) (“We find that the
language of Section 9(c)(1) of the Act and [29 C.F.R.] Section 102.63(a) of the Board’s Rules required
the Acting Regional Director to provide ‘an appropriate hearing’ prior to finding that a question concerning representation existed and directing an election .”); DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8,
at 19 (“The requirement that the Board hold pre-election legal hearings prevents it from expediting the
election process in a significant way.”). Former NLRB Chairman William B. Gould notes that the
Board in Angelica held that “a hearing in some form is required prior to the time the election takes
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Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a
question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for
an appropriate hearing upon due notice. . . . If the Board finds upon
the record of such hearing that such a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
23
results thereof.
24

Originally enacted as part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments, the
provision arguably narrowed the discretion the Board had under the Wagner
25
Act, in part to implement the Taft-Hartley requirement of elections as a
26
prerequisite to NLRB certification.
place. . . . although it was not addressed . . . precisely how one would define a hearing.” William B.
Gould IV, Labored Relations: Law, Politics, and the NLRB 410 app. (2000).
23 NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
24 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
25 Section 9(c) of the original Wagner Act provided:
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the
Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of
the representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board
shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding
under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any suitable
method to ascert[a]in such representatives.
49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006)).
The Board experimented with prehearing elections starting in 1945. See NLRB THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,
1948, at 20 (1949); NLRB, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1947, at 3 (1948). During the Taft-Hartley deliberations,
Congress rejected a provision in conference that would have expressly authorized such elections. Explaining the conference committee’s actions, Senator Taft insisted that the committee was not changing
existing law:
26

Section 9(c)(4): The conferees dropped from this section a provision authorizing pre-hearing elections. That omission has brought forth the charge that we have thereby greatly impeded the Board
in its disposition of representation matters. We have not changed the words of existing law providing a hearing in every ease unless waived by stipulation of the parties. It is the function of hearings in, representation cases to determine whether an election may properly be held at the time;
and if so, to decide questions of unit and eligibility to vote. During the last year the Board has
tried out a device of holding the election first and then providing the hearing to which the parties
were entitled by law. Since its use has been confined to an inconsequential percentage of cases,
and more often than not a subsequent hearing was still necessary and because the House conferees
strenuously objected to its continuance it was omitted from the bill.
93 Cong. Reg. S7002 (daily ed. June 12, 1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR RELATIONS MANAGEMENT ACT, 1947, at 1625 (1985). The Board in 1948, however, read the
1947 amendment as “abolish[ing] . . . a practice instituted in 1945, of permitting the Regional Director
in appropriate circumstances to conduct the election, upon due notice to the parties, before holding the
hearing.” NLRB, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 20.

2010]

Improving Administration of NLRA Without Statutory Change

369

Section 9(c)(1) plainly requires the Board to hold “an appropriate
hearing” prior to the election to satisfy itself that a question concerning
representation exists. The issue is whether more is required in this preelection hearing other than to determine whether the labor organization has
petitioned for an election in a unit whose appropriateness is wellestablished under agency case law, to determine whether the agency has
statutory jurisdiction in the particular case, and to mandate the sealing of
any challenged ballots, including challenges based on eligibility issues. If
the respondent believes that the facts of its case require some variance from
well-established Board law, that matter, if properly preserved, could be
taken up after the election in a second-stage precertification inquiry. Functionally, this precertification inquiry would be similar to the situation where
the Board grants a request for review from the regional director’s decision
directing an election. Neither the request nor the grant of the request
27
operates as a stay of the election.
(ii) Addressing Highly Contested Cases The problem of delay in representation cases may have less to do with the median cases than with
28
highly contested cases. Consider the following preliminary results from
NLRB data:
Table 2: Effect of Blocking Charges, 2008
No. of Petitions Proceeding to Election in 2008

2,024

No. of Blocked Petitions

284

Median No. of Days from Petition to Election in Blocked Cases

139

No. of Unblocked Petitions

1,740

Median No. of Days from Petition to Election in Unblocked Cases

38

Average No. of Days from Petition to Election in Unblocked Cases

39

Source: NLRB data (on file with author).

The Board should study the characteristics of the cases that take the
longest time. For example, in 2008, 12.4% of the cases took longer than the
median time to go to election and took longer than three weeks from the

27

See 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(b) (2009).
Thus, for example, Ferguson reports: “The tail . . . is quite long; the maximum delay before
election recorded in the data is 1,705 days. . . . The average time to election or withdrawal was 50 days,
and cases in the 95th percentile were open for 234 days.” Ferguson, supra note 16, at 10 n.9; see also
DUNLOP COMMISSION FACT-FINDING, supra note 15 at 81 ex.III-3. A good portion of this tail appears to
be comprised of “blocked” cases. See Berton B. Subrin, The NLRB’s Blocking Charge Policy: Wisdom
or Folly?, 39 LAB. L.J. 651(1988), and infra Table 2.
28
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election for the results to be certified. As Table 2 indicates, in 284 of the
2,024 petitions that proceeded to election in 2008, allegations of employer
violations triggered the filing of a “blocking charge” by a labor organization, delaying the holding of the election, The median for this subset was
139 days compared to thirty-eight days overall. To the extent the Board’s
blocking-charge policy is exploited by charging parties unreasonably to
delay elections, the Board should reexamine that policy and hold elections
29
sooner even in the face of outstanding unfair labor practices.
b. Experimenting with Internet and Mail Balloting
The Board could experiment with broader use of mail balloting and
possible Internet polling procedures that permit employees to cast anony30
mous ballots away from the employer’s premises. This would meet the
criticism that making employees vote on representation at their workplace
unnecessarily brings home the message of employer power and possible
31
intimidation. The National Mediation Board (NMB), the agency responsible for conducting representation elections under the Railway Labor Act,
32
uses such procedures and, as Professor Sachs suggests, the Board can
33
adapt them for NLRA purposes. Nothing in the NLRA requires that the
polling place be at the place of work or any other particular location.
2. Unfair Labor Practice Cases
Delay in the system in connection with unfair labor practices could
occur at several stages: (1) the period between filing a charge and issuing a
complaint; (2) the period between issuing the complaint and closing the
29 See Subrin, supra note 28. It is not always clear that the best response to alleged employer
unlawful practices is deferring the holding of an election; it is hardly inconceivable that the relatively
prompt convening of an election, coupled with broadened section 10(j) preliminary injunctive relief,
provides a better cure. See discussion infra Part II.C.
30 The Board presently uses mail balloting when eligible voters are “scattered,” meaning they
work over a vast geographic area or their work schedules vary significantly. E.g., Halliburton Serv., 265
N.L.R.B. 1154, 1188 (1982) (noting that an election should be held on the employer’s premises absent
good cause to the contrary, as determined by the regional director); see also NLRB, CASE HANDLING
MANUAL, pt. 2 § 11301.2 (2003), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/legal/manuals/CHM2/
CHM2.pdf.
31 See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal
Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 565-69 (1993). On the other hand, mail or Internet balloting raises
issues of possible intimidation by union representatives and may lead to lower employee turnout than
workplace balloting.
32 See Benjamin Sachs, Card Check and Employee Choice: A New Altering Rule for Labor Law’s
Asymmetric Default, 123 HARV. L. REV. 3 (forthcoming Jan. 2010).
33 The NMB’s Telephone Electronic Voting and Internet Voting system does not presently permit
employees to change their votes once they have been cast. Nat’l Mediation Bd., Frequently Asked
Questions: Representation, http://www.nmb.gov/representation/faqs-ola.html.
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record of the adversary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ);
(3) the period between closing the record and issuance of the ALJ’s decision; (4) the period between issuance of the ALJ’s decision and, if there are
exceptions, the order and decision by the Board itself; and (5) the period
between the issuance of the Board’s order and decision and the ruling of the
court of appeals to enforce the Board’s order. Only the first four areas are
within the Board’s ambit of influence. Dealing with the fifth would require
a statutory amendment providing for self-enforcing Board orders, with the
burden on the respondent to secure a judicial stay of the agency order.
Table 3: Section 10(j) Cases Resulting in District Court Filings, 2004-08
Filing of Charge to District Court Filing
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
Filing of Charge to RD Determination
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
From RD Determination to Advice Determination
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
Filing of Charge to Advice Determination
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
Filing of Charge to Board Determination
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
From Advice Determination to Board Determination
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days

88
1,658
334
263
22
1,603
187
120
15
550
111
65
70
1,630
309
219
88
1,652
334
264
0
106
23
29
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From Board Determination to District Court Filing
Minimum No. of Days
Maximum No. of Days
Average No. of Days
Median No. of Days
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1
68
5
8

Source: NLRB data (on file with author). Details of the cases references in Table 3
are provided in Appendix A.

For cases completed during the Board’s fiscal year ending September
30, 2008, a median of 559 days transpired from the filing of a charge to
issuance of a Board decision. A good part of this delay is after the hearing
has been completed and the ALJ has issued his or her decision; it took 269
34
days for the median ALJ decision to culminate in a Board decision. For
35
fiscal year 2003, the numbers were, respectively, 647 days and 420 days.
These figures suggest a continuing problem. Once the Board reaches
its full membership complement, the Board should authorize its chairman to
36
assign cases to Board members, place time limits on how long a case can
remain on a Board member’s desk, and, if those limits are not met, reassign
37
the case to another Board member.
B.

Greater Use of Rulemaking

The Supreme Court made clear in a unanimous 1991 decision,
38
American Hospital Association v. NLRB, that the Board has substantive
39
rulemaking authority under section 6 of the Act. The Board has not used
34 See NLRB, SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2008, at 138, available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Annual% 20Reports/Entire2008Annual.pdf. While
2008 may not be a representative year because the Board only had two members, the figures for 2003,
when the Board enjoyed a full complement of five members, suggest even longer time periods. NLRB,
SIXTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2003, at 199, available at http:// www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/
shared_files/brochures/Annual%20Reports/Entire2003AnnualReportreduced.pdf.
35 NLRB, Sixty-Eighth Annual Report, supra note 34, at 199.
36 Congress barred the Board itself from employing “any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing
transcripts of hearing or preparing drafts of opinions.” NLRA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). This
should not prevent the agency chairman or any other member from using his or her attorney staff and
sometimes pooling several members' staff to screen cases that can be decided by summary decision and
those that require assignment to a Board member for a more extended decision. See generally John E.
Higgins Jr., Labor Czars – Commissars – Keeping Women in the Kitchen – The Purpose and Effects of
the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 941 (1998).
37 See Estreicher & Bodie, supra note 13, at 95-96.
38 499 U.S. 609 (1991).
39 Id. at 609 (“Section 6 granted the Board ‘authority from time to time to make, amend, and
rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions’ of the Act.”
(quoting NLRA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2006))).
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this authority, however, with the exception of the rules for bargaining units
40
in acute health care facilities upheld by American Hospital Association.
One reason the Board may hesitate to use its rulemaking power is a desire
to shield itself from congressional scrutiny that may not occur when Board
members embed their policy judgments in factual determinations made in
the course of adjudications. During the Clinton administration, the Board
proposed a rule establishing the appropriateness of a single-location bargaining unit in the absence of “extraordinary circumstances.” Congress
barred use of any monies on the single-location proceeding, however, and
41
the Board abandoned the effort after three years. This experience suggests
that the Board will not readily embark on additional experiments of this
type.
The Clinton Board’s unhappy experience with the single-location rule
offers a cautionary note, but should not discourage use of rulemaking altogether. The agency is likely to be on a firmer footing if it uses rulemaking,
not for the purpose of rigidifying a Board standard for all industries irrespective of countervailing factual circumstances – such as the presumptive
appropriateness of single-location units – but for the more limited purpose
of providing for a uniform rule where nationwide uniformity makes sense.
One such area would be a proposed rule setting forth the text of a poster
reciting the rights of employees under the NLRA that employers would be
required to post in cafeterias and break areas alongside similar notices from
42
other government agencies. Another potentially fruitful effort would be a

40 See generally Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Plea for
Rulemaking, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 163 (1985); Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An
Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991).
41 See Joan Flynn, “Expertness for What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and the Irrepressible
Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 501-02, nn.151-52 (2000). Congress in
1947 also curiously barred the Board from “appoint[ingl individuals for . . . economic analysis.” NLRA
§ 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). A history of this exclusion is given in Catherine Fisk & Deborah C.
Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2045-49 (2009). The section 4(a) limitation did not hamper the
Board when it promulgated health care bargaining units in 1988. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the
Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,336-46 (Apr. 21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30)
(certification required by Regulatory Flexibility Act, 6 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (2006)). In the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Congress provided for judicial review of agency
compliance with its regulatory fairness review requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2006) (amended 2007).
Whatever the intention behind the section 4(a) prohibition, it does not bar the Board from hiring individuals with statistical expertise, or from borrowing staff from other agencies, to help it conduct regulatory compliance reviews.
42 Along with Professor Charles J. Morris, the author asked the Board to issue such a rule back in
1993 – a petition the Board has yet to act upon. See AFL-CIO General Counsel Urges NLRB to Require
Notices Describing NLRA Rights, 192 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-10 (Oct. 3, 2003). The Department
of Labor has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking that would require a similar notification of NLRA
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proposed rule containing the text of a model authorization card that would
be used for ascertaining both whether there is sufficient interest to hold an
election and whether there is a card majority in circumstances where bargaining authority could be established without an election (as proposed by
section 2 of the EFCA).
NLRB policy reversals – which come with each new administration as
surely as spring follows winter – is another area where properly employed
rulemaking would enhance the confidence of the parties that acting in conformity with preexisting Board law will not result in adverse remedial consequences. Confining policy reversal to the rulemaking process also would
encourage greater judicial deference. It would be strongly presumed that
until a new rule has been promulgated, the General Counsel would issue
complaints on the basis of preexisting NLRB law. The Board thus would
promote certainty and establish a process likely to lead to better rules. In
essence, the regulated public would be told in advance which prior decisions the Board is interested in possibly reversing and would be asked to
address specific questions and identify sources of information that would
43
aid the agency.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN NLRB POLICY
I address here only three of the several areas of Board policy that
should be revisited: union access rules, voluntary “framework” agreements
subject to “ex post authorization,” and remedies.
A.

Access Rules

The Supreme Court has made clear that unless employees are living
near worksites distant from the usual means of communication, the Board
cannot hold employers in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA if, without discrimination, they refuse to allow nonemployee union organizers on
44
their property to address employees. The Court has not purported, howevrights by federal contractors. Notification of Employee Rights Under Federal Labor Laws, 74 Fed. Reg.
38,488 (proposed Aug. 3, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 471).
43 Even if the Board does not employ rulemaking, it could still use a better process for policy
reversals. The Board could publish notice of an Agenda of Proposed Policy Changes with an opportunity for public comment. Cases presenting issues listed on this Agenda would be prime targets for issuance of a complaint and expedited consideration. Oral argument and briefing would be scheduled for
every case on the Agenda thought to be a vehicle for a policy reversal. To focus attention and avoid
repetition, any oral argument should be limited to one hour for each side of the issue. Thus, absent
special circumstances, the General Counsel and the charging party would be limited to a half hour each,
and the respondent to one hour. Any amici wishing to argue would need to secure consent of the party
to share its time.
44 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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45

er, to alter the scope of the Board’s authority, first announced in General
46
Shoe Corp., to establish under section 9 of the NLRA the preconditions
(“laboratory conditions”) under which it will certify the results of an election rather than hold a rerun election. Under this doctrine, the Board can
overturn elections not conforming to “laboratory conditions” whether or not
an unfair labor practice has been committed and presumably without regard
to statutory limits on its ULP authority, such as the so-called employer free
47
speech provision, section 8(c) of the NLRA. The Board has used its
General Shoe authority to bar massed-assembly speeches on company time
48
within twenty-four hours of a scheduled election, and to require employers
to transmit a list of the names and addresses of the employees eligible to
vote in the election to the petitioning union seven days after the scheduling
of an election. (The latter is called an “Excelsior list” because the rule was
49
announced in Excelsior Underwear, Inc. )
The Board’s Excelsior decision suggests a persuasive rationale for expanding union access rights in particular circumstances. The Board distinguished earlier Supreme Court decisions in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox
50
51
Co. and NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, which barred union
52
access rights under the Board’s section 8 ULP authority. In the Excelsior
context, the Board reasoned, employees’ section 7 interests were centrally
involved, thus altering the balance between employer interests and section 7
rights:
[E]ven assuming that there is some legitimate employer interest in
nondisclosure, we think it relevant that the subordination of the
interest which we here require is limited to a situation in which employee interests in self organization are shown to be substantial. For,
whenever an election is directed (the precondition to disclosure) the
Regional Director has found that a real question concerning representation exists, . . . The opportunity to communicate on company

45

NLRA § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006).
77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
47 Id. at 126 (“Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will
sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an unfair labor
practice.”).
48 See Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
49 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
50 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (presaging the Court’s decision in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527
(1992)).
51 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
52 Id. at 363-64; Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112.
46
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premises sought in Babcock and Nutone was not limited to the situa53
tion in which employee organizational interests were substantial. . . .
By similar reasoning, the Board could claim authority under General
Shoe to declare that a fair election process requires that once a union has
presented a showing of interest sufficient to trigger a representation election, the interests of the employee electorate in making an informed decision require that the union be given limited access to the employees on the
54
company premises to present its case. Similar to the access rules often
sought by unions in “neutrality” agreements, the union’s access could be
limited to nonwork areas like the parking lot, cafeteria, and break room, and
could be conditioned on compliance with reasonable security procedures.
Because union access under this proposal would be triggered by the Board’s
determination of an interest requirement rather than any particular expressive activity of the employer, there should be no serious section 8(c) con55
cern with this application of the General Shoe doctrine.
B.

Promoting Voluntary Recognition Agreements Subject to “Ex Post
Authorization”

The Board should revisit its prior decision in Majestic Weaving Co.,
56
Inc., in which it ruled that employers violate the law if they recognize
unions before they have obtained majority support, even if the recognition
or agreement is expressly subject to a later showing of majority support.
The Board’s ruling is based on a flawed analysis. The statutory prohibition
is employer recognition of a minority union, not discussions with a union
on the basic approach to future bargaining should the union demonstrate
majority support in an appropriate unit. Overturning Majestic Weaving
would provide employers and unions greater leeway to enter into agree53

Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1245.
See generally Julius G. Getman,Ruminations on Union Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 45, 71 (1986) (“The missing ingredient of free choice is most likely to be a sense of the
particular union involved in the campaign: its representatives, its arguments, and its record. It seems
obvious that employees who know the employer but are doubtful about the union ought to be given the
chance to learn about the union at first hand.”).
55 For developments under the Railway Labor Act, see US Airways, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation
Bd.,177 F.3d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding NMB’s order for rerun election on grounds of employer
interference violated employer’s right to free speech when employer speech based on objective predictions); Shawn J. Larsen-Bright, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) (arguing that laboratory conditions doctrine as currently enforced is contrary
to statute and to employer's First Amendment right to free speech).
56 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860 (1964), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., Inc., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966). Majestic Weaving overruled the Board’s prior decision in
Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38, 39 (1949) (holding in pertinent part that a contract begun with a
minority union is valid if the union has a majority by the time the contract is executed).
54

2010]

Improving Administration of NLRA Without Statutory Change

377

ments providing a framework for future recognition even if the union does
not have the majority support of employees in the bargaining unit at the
time of the agreement. The Board should, however, insist on two essential
requirements:
(1) transparency – the parties must openly state that they are entering
into a framework agreement setting only guidelines for any future
bargaining for a collective bargaining agreement, and that bargaining
would not take place until the union obtains bargaining authority; and
(2) “ex post authorization” – the agreement must expressly provide an
opportunity for the employees to decide later, preferably by secret ballot, whether they wish to authorize the union’s bargaining authority.
This approach would impart valuable information to employees to
guide their decision because the framework agreement would illuminate the
union’s bargaining objectives and its likely efficacy as a bargaining agent.
It also would provide an opportunity for the parties to explore new
approaches to a bargaining relationship, especially at new sites of employ57
ment.
C.

Remedies

Remedies are the linchpin. A law is only as good as its remedies, and
the NLRB’s remedial authority as practiced seems particularly deficient.
Even here, the agency can do a good deal more with its statutory authority
than it has in the past.
1. Delegation of section 10(j) Authority to the General Counsel
The extent to which employers unlawfully discharge union supporters
during organizing drives and elections remains unclear, in part because the
Board until very recently did not collect reliable data on the subject.
Apparently, the Board’s data did not differentiate ULP charges filed during
union organizing campaigns from those against unionized employers until
58
2007. Rough estimates of the frequency before 2007 vary. Harvard law
professor Paul Weiler estimated in 1983 that one in twenty union supporters
57 The author advanced this proposal in Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law
Reform: Opening up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834-40 (1996).
The Dunlop Commission’s recommendation would allow a subsequent showing of majority support
“either by card check or representation election.” DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 11;
see also Jonathan P. Hiatt & Craig Becker, Forum:At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be
Retired?: A Response to Professor Dannin, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 301-06 (2005).
58 See J. Justin Wilson, AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NLRB DATA ON UNLAWFUL TERMINATION
DURING UNION ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS, 2007 TO 2008, at 1, n.5 (2009) (on file with author).
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59

is unlawfully fired. The late University of Chicago law professor Bernard
Meltzer and economist Robert LaLonde calculated a one-in-sixty-three
60
probability of unlawful discharge in 1991. Researchers John Schmitt and
Ben Zipperer estimated a one-in-seventy-three rate of retaliatory discharge
61
for 2000 and a one-in-fifty-two rate for 2001-2007.
The Board’s data since 2007 on the incidence of section 8(a)(1) and
(3) charges during organizing campaigns reveal that 1,454 representation
cases contained such charges in fiscal year 2007, 830 representation cases
contained such charges in fiscal year 2008, and, so far in fiscal year 2009
62
(as of October 1, 2009), 584 representation cases contain such charges.
Unfortunately, the Board’s figures do not reveal the number of employees
discriminated against or the disposition of those charges.
Whatever the rate of retaliatory discharge, it is too high. The Board
needs to make clear that it is prepared to seek court-imposed provisional
reinstatement of every employee where there is reasonable cause to believe
that the employer discharged the employee for seeking collective representation. No other remedy under current law would more effectively bring
home the central message of the NLRA: Employees will not suffer any loss
of employment or benefit if they choose to engage in concerted activity.
Section 10(l) expressly grants the Board this authority and requires the
regional director to seek preliminary injunctions to restrain certain union
63
ULPs. Section 10(j), the provision governing other ULPs (including all
employer ULPs), is stated in more discretionary terms and contemplates
action by the Board: “The Board shall have power . . . to petition [the feder64
al district court] for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. . . .
Although section 10(j) speaks in terms of action by the Board, the
65
agency has from time to time, with judicial approval, delegated this authority to either the General Counsel or the regional directors. Presently,
because the Board has only two members, the Board has delegated its sec66
tion 10(j) authority to the General Counsel. Even after the Board reaches
full strength, it should keep in place this delegation. This will eliminate the
59 See Paul C. Weller, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1781 (1983).
60 See Robert J. LaLonde & Bernard D. Metzler, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at the
Significance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 953, 992 (1991).
61 See John Schmitt & Ben Zipperer, Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election
Campaigns, 1951-2007, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, at 5, 10-11 (March 2009),
http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dropping-the-ax-update-2009-03.pdf.
62 NLRB data (on file with author).
63 NLRA § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2006).
64 NLRA § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006).
65 See, e.g., Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 540 (4th Cir. 2009).
66 See id. at 539.
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delay inherent in requiring the regional director to obtain authority to seek a
preliminary injunction from both the General Counsel and the Board.
Moreover, the Board should direct the General Counsel to seek section
10(j) relief in every case where there is reasonable cause to believe an
employer fired an employee during an organizing drive or an election campaign for exercising statutory rights. To bolster the agency’s credibility in
the district courts, and in fairness to legitimate employer interests, the
General Counsel should provide employers an opportunity to challenge the
credibility of witnesses in a one- or two-day hearing before authorizing the
67
section 10(j) application. The Board and General Counsel also should
systematically review procedures for processing section 10(j) requests in
68
order to minimize avoidable delay.
2. Imposing Bargaining Obligations Due to the Absence of GoodFaith Doubt in the Union’s Majority
The Board has the authority to dispense with its “election preference”
policy and impose a bargaining obligation on employers who lack a reason69
able good-faith basis for doubting the union’s card-based majority status.
70
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the
Board asserted the authority to impose such obligations on employers that
71
72
commit ULPs indicating a lack of good-faith doubt. In Gissel, the Court
noted that the Board said that it no longer followed the “good faith doubt”
73
policy the Board had previously established in Aaron Brothers Co. and
74
Joy Silk Mills, Inc. The Court’s Gissel decision and its subsequent ruling
75
in Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co v. NLRB make clear, however,
that the Board’s “election preference” policy is an exercise of the Board’s
76
policymaking discretion and is not affirmatively required by the Act.

67

I thank former NLRB Regional Director Daniel Silverman for the latter suggestion.
Time periods for 2004-2008 are set forth in Table 3, supra. Detail on the cases referenced in
Table 3 are provided in Appendix A to this article.
69 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 591-92.
72 Id. at 590-94.
73 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
74 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
75 419 U.S. 301, 309-10 (1974).
76 The Aaron Brothers-Joy Silk approach is administratively more manageable and more consistent with underlying deterrence goals than the present “can a fair rerun-election be held?” test. This is
because, while the ultimate question is one of the employer’s good faith doubt of the union’s majority
status, the inquiry is principally an objective one – whether the employer has committed unfair labor
practices inconsistent with claimed good faith. Moreover, reviewing courts need to be reminded of the
origins and limits of the Board’s “election preference” policy in reviewing NLRB bargaining orders.
68
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3. Remedies for Unlawful Refusal to Bargain
Under section 8(d), the Board does not have the authority to impose a
contract or any contract term as a remedy for an employer’s refusal to bar77
gain in good faith. The Board in appropriate circumstances may impose
78
so-called extraordinary union access as well as negotiation and litigation
79
expense remedies, but the Board’s remedial apparatus also includes the
ability to treat any strike in protest of the employer’s ULPs as an ULP
strike, thereby privileging the strikers to reinstatement in their previous jobs
80
once they have made clear they wish to return. Under current Board practice, the determination that a strike is an ULP strike occurs only retrospectively, after the strike has occurred and after employers have replaced strik81
ing employees. The Board should consider a more liberal advisory opinion practice, at least in first-time bargaining situations, that provides critical
information to employees before they put their jobs at risk. Employees
should be able to petition the Board for a nonbinding preliminary ruling as
82
to whether the Board is likely to treat the strike as an ULP strike.
A combination of the three remedial proposals offers a promising start.
In addition to the “extraordinary” remedies now in use, the Board would be
Interim relief under section 1.0(j) is also important here. See generally Samuel Estreicher, The Second
Circuit and the NLRB 1980-1981: A Case Study in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 48 BROOK L.
REV. 1063, 1084-94 (1982); Laura S. Cooper & Dennis R. Nolan, The Story of NLRB v. Gissel Packing:
The Practical Limits of Paternalism in LABOR LAW STORIES 213, 215-17, 219-22 (Laura J. Cooper &
Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005).
77 See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970). The discussion assumes arguendo that
H.K. Porter’s treatment of 8(d) bars the “make-whole” remedy considered but rejected in Ex-Cell-O
Corp., 186 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970). That assumption also warrants reexamination by the NLRB.
78 See Monfort, Inc. v. NLRB, 965 F.2d 1538, 1547-48 (10th Cir. 1992); Fieldcrest Cannon, 318
N.L.R.B. 470, 473 (1995), enforced in part, 97 F.3d 65, 74 (4th Cir. 1996). General Counsel Ronald
Meisburg has commendably given priority treatment to the need for special remedies in first-contract
bargaining cases. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 06.05 (2006); OFFICE OF THE
GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 07-08 (2007); OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. GC 0808 (2008); OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEM. G.C. 08-09 (2008), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/research/general_counsel_memos.aspx (select year of memorandum and follow
hyperlink to document).
79 See Frontier Hotel & Casino, 318 N.L.R.B. 857, 859-60 (1995), enforced in relevant part, 118
F.3d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Alwin Mfg. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (1998), enforced, 192 F.2d 133 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). The Board could make these remedies more readily available after proper rulemaking procedures. See supra Part I.B.
80 For an interesting proposal to protect ULP strikes, see William R. Corbett, A Proposal for
Procedural Limitations on Hiring Permanent Replacements: “A Far, Far Better Thing” Than the Workplace Fairness Act, 72 N.C. L. REV. 813 (1994).
81 Id.
82 The entire issue of when an economic strike becomes converted into an ULP strike calls for
greater reliance by the Board on declaratory orders. See id. The Board's current procedures provide for
advisory opinions and declaratory orders regarding jurisdiction. See NLRB, Rules and Regulations and
Statements of Procedure – § 101.39-101.43 (2009).
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able to (1) reinstate employees preliminarily when there is reasonable cause
to believe an employer discharged the person in violation of section 8(a)(3);
(2) impose a bargaining obligation on the employer because of the absence
of good-faith doubt, as evidenced by employer ULPs, in appropriate cases
backed up by a petition for interim injunctive relief; and (3) employ an advisory ruling procedure to inform employees whether the Board is likely to
treat the strike they are engaged in as an ULP strike. Together, the options
would go far in allowing the Board to structure a meaningful remedy even
in first-time bargaining situations.
III. CONCLUSION
These proposals are by no means exhaustive; more can be said and
other ideas pursued. In any event, the NLRA has not “ossified,” as some in
academic circles have claimed. Rather, its principal guardians, the members of the NLRB and General Counsel, need to take seriously their mandate to make this statute work as well as it can.
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Appendix A:
Details of Section 10(j) Cases Resulting in District Court Filings,
2004-2008
Date Charge
Filed

10(j),
Date
Requested

10(j),
Sua
Sponte

Case
Group,
Lead

10(j), RD
Determination
Date

10(j), Advice
Determination
Date

10(j), Board
Determination
Date

10(j), Date
Petition Filed

02/04/2003

Y

02/04/2003

Y

12/05/2003

02/04/2003

Y

12/05/2003

12/30/2003

01/12/2004

10/27/2003

12/05/2003

12/31/2003

01/12/2004

07/26/2005

10/19/2005

11/25/2005

12/01/2005

04/16/2004

05/06/2004

05/11/2004

12/16/2004

12/22/2004

05/25/2006

06/06/2006

Y

01/12/2004
01/12/2004

02/04/2003

02/03/2003

N

06/09/2005

06/09/2005

Y

07/14/2003

02/09/2004

Y

Y

02/09/2004

08/17/2004

08/18/2004

N

Y

09/08/2004

10/12/2005

01/04/2006

Y

Y

01/11/2006

09/17/2004

09/17/2004

Y

Y

12/05/2004

07/13/2005

07/19/2005

04/07/2005

04/07/2005

N

Y

06/01/2005

10/19/2005

10/25/2005

05/12/2005

05/12/2005

N

07/09/2004

12/29/2004

N

07/25/2005

07/25/2005

10/06/2006

05/17/2006

08/16/2005
02/28/2005

06/08/2005

07/06/2005

07/11/2005

Y

10/27/2005

01/03/2006

02/15/2006

02/24/2006

10/06/2006

Y

12/19/2006

01/26/2007

02/14/2007

04/23/2007

01/25/2005

01/25/2005

Y

Y

08/03/2005

08/31/2005

11/30/2005

Y

Y

12/15/2005

04/05/2006

05/04/2006

05/08/2006

02/06/2006

03/01/2006

N

Y

10/16

10/16/2006

12/06/2006

12/11/2006

05/03/2006
06/08/2006

Y

10/26/2005

10/24/2005

Y
12/06/2006

N

Y

12/11/2006
04/19/2007

05/29/2007

07/11/2007

07/13/2007

11/17/2008

11/20/2008

07/22/2008

Y

07/22/2008

Y

03/16/2009

11/17/2008

11/20/2008

07/22/2008

07/22/2008

N

Y

09/2412008

10/17/2008

11/20/2008

07/22/2008

11/21/2008

N

Y

03/16/2009

10/17/2008

11/20/2008

06/25/2004

08/13/2004

Y

11/05/2004

02/23/2005

03/21/2005

03/ 24/2005

03/24/2006

03/30/2006

Y

06/16/2006

07/18/2006

08/10/2006

08/15/2006

06/02/2005

06/28/2005

Y

07/28/2006

01/29/2008

01/29/2008

01/31/2008
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10(j), RD
Determination
Date

10(j), Advice
Determination
Date

10(j), Board
Determination
Date

10(j), Date
Petition Filed

03/06/2006

04/26/2006

06/06/2006

06/09/2006

11/20/2007

12/28/2007

01/08/2008

Y

09/06/2006

12/15/2006

01/10/2007

Y

12/17/2007

Date Charge
Filed

10(j),
Date
Requested

10(j),
Sua
Sponte

Case
Group,
Lead

07/06/2005

07/26/2005

Y

01/29/2007

10/24/2007

Y

Y

05/16/2006

05/16/2006

Y

10/05/2007

10/05/2007

Y

07/07/2006

07/07/2006

N

0711/2007

08/01/2007

Y

01/08/2008

02/22/2008

01/08/2008

04/22/2008

08/10/2006

09/18/2006

10/05/2006

10/10/2006

Y

08/10/2007

09/19/2007

10/09/2007

10/12/2007

Y

Y

02/22/2008

04/0912008

04/17/2008

0411812008

05/02/2008

Y

Y

05/02/2008

02/15/2008

02/15/2008

N

03/11/2008

05/08/2008

05/08/2008

05/13/2008

04/10/2007

04/10/2007

Y

06/25/2007

07/30/2007

08/16/2007

08/17/2007

07/08/2005

07/08/2005

Y

11/04/2005

02/16/2006

03/24/2006

03/23/2006

08/14/2006

10/31/2006

Y

Y

11/17/2006

01/11/2007

02/01/2007

02/0812007

12/08/2006

01/12/2007

Y

Y

02/16/2007

05/02/2007

05/16/2007

05/21/2007

12/22/2006

12/22/2006

N

03/12/2007

05/07/2007

05/25/2007

05/30/2007

08/30/2004

08/30/2004

Y

12/20/2004

01/04/2005

02/16/2005

03/01/2005

02/02/2005

02/24/2005

N

Y

04/04/2005

03/08/2006

05/10/2006

05/16/2006

11/16/2005

11/16/2005

N

Y

04/27/2006

05/30/2006

06/28/2006

06/29/2006

04/09/2003

07/29/2003

N

Y

05/13/2004

06/24/2004

07/29/2004

08/02/2004

10/18/2005

10/18/2005

Y

02/24/2006

10/31/2006

11/24/2006

11/28/2006

07/14/2004

08/10/2004

Y

04/01/2005

08/18/2005

11/02/2005

11/17/2005

01/03/2005

01/19/2005

Y

05/19/2005

08/01/2005

11/07/2005

11/23/2005

09/21/2005

09/21/2005

N

01/18/2006

08/04/2006

08/27/2006

08/31/2006

11/21/2001

04/03/2006

Y

04/12/2006

05/09/2006

05/31/2006

06/06/2006

07/19/2002

12/17/2002

N

Y

11/18/2003

11/18/2003

02/10/2004

02/13/2004

01/20/2004

08/16/2004

Y

Y

08/19/2004

09/13/2004

10/22/2004

10/27/2004

06/13/2006

08/10/2006

Y

03/14/2007

03/19/2007

09/18/2007

09/27/2007

Y

10/31/2006

12/21/2006

Y

07/17/2002

04/17/2003

N

Y

08/05/2008

08/10/2006
Y

Y

01/16/2008

0212812008

02/28/2008

03/06/2008

03/01/2007

06/01/2007

06/21/2007

06/27/2007

11 /07/2003

01/22/2004

01/22/2004

01/26/2004

FIU Law Review
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10(j), Advice
Determination
Date

[5:361
10(j), Board
Determination
Date

Date Charge
Filed

10(j),
Date
Requested

10(j),
Sua
Sponte

Case
Group,
Lead

10(j), RD
Determination
Date

08/09/2006

09/22/2006

Y

Y

01/10/2007

09/07/2006

11/21/2006

Y

09/18/2006

11/21/2006

Y

09/22/2006

11/21/2006

Y

01/05/2007

01/31/2007

03/05/2007

03/26/2007

Y

04/25/2007

06/29/2007

07/27/2007

04/29/2002

05/01/2002

Y

Y

07/15/2002

09/12/2002

02/20/2004

07/14/2004

07/14/2004

Y

Y

11/19/2004

01/04/2005

02/15/2005

02/25/2005

09/27/2004

09/27/2004

Y

Y

02/24/2005

12/13/2005

03/29/2006

04/10/2006

07/22/2005

07/22/2005

Y

Y

07/28/2006

07/20/2007

07/24/2007

07/30/2007

10/11/2005

08/30/2006

Y

Y

03/29/2007

03/24/2006

03/24/2006

Y

Y

03/29/2007

09/29/2006

10/03/2006

Y

Y

07/13/2007

08/13/2007

08/15/2007

Y

09/03/2003

10/15/2005

Y

01/12/2006

01/12 2006

08/18/2006

10(j), Date
Petition Filed

05/11/2007
03/19/2007

Y

03/19/2007
03/14/2007

03/19/2007

06/14/2007
05/15/2007

06/05/2007

06/14/2007

09/17/2007

09/25/2007

12/28/2007

03/19/2008

03/19/2008

03/21/2008

Y

10/18/2005

12/05/2005

01/24/2006

01/30/2006

Y

Y

05/23/2006

06/30/2006

07/20/2006

07/25/2006

01/14/2008

N

Y

02/04/2008

02/29/2008

03/06/2008

01/26/2007

01/26/2007

N

Y

07/17/2007

02/07/2008

02/14/2008

02/20/2008

02/01/2007

02/08/2007

Y

Y

07/17/2007

02/07/2008

02/14/2008

02/20/2008

10/04/2005

10/18/2005

Y

02/24/2006

03/01/2006

05/16/2008

06/09/2008

Y

Y

07/25/2008

09/23/2008

12/19/2003

12/22/2003

Y

Y

02/11/2005

07/12/2006

07/26/2006

07/28/2006

01/29/2008

01/29/2008

Y

06/01/2008

07/10/2008

07/10/2008

07/14/2008

11/23/2005

Source: NLRB data (on file with author).
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